

The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Pocketbook

Voting

Does connection to a racial or ethnic group change how unemployment affects party identification in the United States?

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Does unemployment (and thus less cash in an individual's pocket) inadvertently buy votes for the Democratic Party? And if so, to what extent is this true for the major ethnic/racial groups (whites, blacks, and Latinos¹) in the United States or is it equally true for the entire United States population over all?

In my honors thesis I study the effects of unemployment status on party identification amongst the major ethnic/racial groups in the United States—whites, blacks, and Latinos. The political experiences of different ethnic/racial groups in the United States are distinct from one another (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Dawson 1994), so why would we assume that unemployment similarly affects these different groups? I seek to determine whether economic voting theories can be applied universally to the United States population or if they are only applicable, or applicable to varying degrees, to specific ethnic/racial groups. There are many theories on economic voting, but for the purpose of my study I will primarily focus on pocketbook voting since the core of my argument centers around whether individuals vote in their self-interest or in the interest of their respective ethnic/racial group (Feldman 1984).

There has been ample research on the effects of economic conditions on American voters and these findings have been applied universally to the United States population². I question this extrapolation with this study. The factors that contribute to voters'

¹ Latinos are the largest ethnic minority making up 17.4% of the United States population, according to 2014 US Census data. Non-Latino whites are the racial majority constituting 62.1% of the US population and blacks are the largest racial minority representing 13.2% of the US population. "QuickFacts." *Census.gov*. United States Census Bureau, n.d. Web. 3 Mar. 2016.

² Frederick Carlsen, Stanley Feldman, Hyeok Yong Kwon, Yotam Margalit, Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, etc. have all studied the effects of economics on voting, but none have considered the differences that may exist between how economics affect minorities differently.

partisanship frequently differ between ethnic/racial groups (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Furthermore, as Michael Dawson (1994) contends, the formative economic experiences of minorities (specifically blacks) are distinct from those of whites. Blacks and Latinos are affected by economic hardships including unemployment at much higher rates (Dawson 1994; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Thus I argue that it is critical not to assume, and instead to test, whether the theory of pocketbook voting is equally applicable to whites, blacks, and Latinos. It is crucial to take into consideration how different racial/ethnic groups operate politically, rather than making assumptions about how they operate based on generic results from studies that may not have factored in a high number of minorities.

While economic conditions have been studied extensively in relation to politics, the literature normally focuses on national conditions, i.e. national unemployment rates (Carlsen 2000; Kwon 2009). Focusing on individual rather than aggregate unemployment will not be original, however, as Yotam Margalit (2013) performed a study between 2007 and 2011 on how individuals' political views changed during the financial crisis and in relation to their personal unemployment and family's financials. Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet (1979) also studied individual unemployment, but this was in relation to congressional voting in 1974 and 1976. My study will differ from the two aforementioned studies by focusing on individual unemployment amongst different ethnic/racial groups.

Furthermore, there has been little research done (if any) on a potential relationship between linked fate and the effects of unemployment on party identification, and specifically how they may be intertwined. Both subjects have been studied separately, but I believe my thesis will make an important contribution to economic voting literature by factoring in whether an individual's connection to their racial/ethnic group impacts how

their personal finances affect their party identification. Overall my study will be original because I take into account ethnic/racial differences on the effects of unemployment on party identification.

I hypothesize that due to the varying significance of linked fate amongst the three major ethnic/racial groups in the United States, the degree to which an individual's personal unemployment status affects their party identification—Republican versus Democrat—will vary. Michael Dawson's (1994) theory of linked fate contends that blacks feel that their well-being is tied to that of their racial peers, and thus vote for the benefit of the group as a whole rather than for their own personal benefit. For the purpose of my research, I am extending this theory to the other major ethnic/racial groups in the United States.

I build my hypotheses on Yotam Margalit's (2013) recent study which found that when individuals' financials are threatened (i.e. they become unemployed) they become more supportive of increased welfare spending—at least initially—if they identified as Republican. I believe that this support for welfare spending should be associated with a move towards identifying with the Democratic Party since they are associated with increased welfare spending and job creation (Carlsen 2000; Kwon 2009; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). Thus, I will test to see whether unemployed individuals are more likely to have identified with the Democratic Party relative to those who are employed.

Consistent with Dawson's (1994) research, I argue that blacks will, to a greater extent than whites and Latinos, view their well-being as tied to that of their racial peers because of their shared experiences of discrimination and segregation. Whites will have the lowest levels of linked fate for a variety of reasons, the most important being that they have

not been unified as a racial group the same way that blacks or Latinos have through discriminatory laws aimed against them or other discriminatory state-governed actions (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Dawson 1994). Latinos' belief that their well-being is tied to that of their ethnic peers will fall in between that of blacks and whites because their perspectives on and experiences with immigration, assimilation, the United States government, etc., vary depending on the generation and country of origin of the Latino in question (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Latinos are not a homogenous group as they are frequently assumed to be. However, they do have a shared language and though their immigrant experiences are not identical, they are campaigned to as a homogenous group and have experienced unifying political events such as Propositions 187, 209, and 227 in California that helped to bond them politically³ (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003).

I hypothesize that for respondents that believe in linked fate, becoming unemployed will have no effect on their party identification. I argue that this is because if an individual votes in the best interest of their group (believes in linked fate), then their personal circumstances should not affect their party identification. The party that is best for their group should not be dependent on what is best for oneself. I believe that this will cause blacks' party identification to be the least affected by unemployment and whites' party identification to be affected the most by unemployment. I anticipate the results for Latinos will fall in between those of whites and blacks.

³ All three propositions were considered anti-immigrant measures, which specifically targeted Latinos in California. They led to political mobilization and protests of the Californian Latino community. Barreto, Matt. "The Prop 187 Effect." *Latino Decisions*. Latino Decisions, 17 Oct. 2013. Web. 11 Nov. 2015.

I test these hypotheses using the 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES). I chose this year for a variety of reasons. First, it is the most recent survey and so will provide the best insight into contemporary political attitudes in the United States. Also, in recent years the ANES has begun to take particular care in including a larger sample of black and Latino respondents⁴. In fact, blacks are actually over represented in this data set as will be demonstrated in Chapter Three. The ANES data is of particular use to my research because it is expansive and asks a wide variety of survey questions. It also includes questions that allow me to test my hypotheses pertaining to linked fate, unemployment, and party identification. In fact, the 2012 survey was the first time that white respondents were asked about linked fate. Furthermore, due to the large volume of questions included in the survey, I will be able to control for many other variables (how people feel about President Barack Obama, education levels, income, etc.) that might influence partisanship.

Rather than studying how national unemployment rates affect party identification, I am interested in how an individual's personal experience with unemployment, coupled with their ethnic/racial identity, affects their party identification. This means that for my study, I am concerned with the unemployment status of each respondent in the ANES survey, rather than the national unemployment rate for 2012. Unfortunately, since the 2012 ANES is not designed as a panel survey with long intervals between the initial and follow-up interviews, I will not be able to see how specific individuals' unemployment *changes* their party identification. Instead I search for an association between

⁴ "Answers to Some Frequently Asked Questions." *ElectionStudies.org*. The American National Election Studies (ANES), Web. 3 Dec. 2015.

unemployment and party identification that I can explain with linked fate, which serves as the causal mechanism. I will do this primarily by running ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to determine whether one's unemployment status predicts his/her party identification. While some might argue logit analysis would be the most accurate type of regression to use since my dependent variable (party identification) is categorical rather than continuous, I have decided instead to mainly interpret OLS regressions since it is the kind of regression that I have the most familiarity with and knowledge of, thus allowing me to more comfortably interpret my results. This choice is also supported by other scholars who are making the move to use OLS rather than logit due to the problem of interpreting logit's interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003). Furthermore, I will only be interpreting the coefficient sign and the statistical significance of the variables in my regressions. I will include logit estimates in my regression tables to confirm that any statistical significance found with the OLS analyses are robust to this alternative specification.

I will first do an analysis for the entire ANES sample, and then separately for blacks, whites, and Latinos to determine the relationship between each group's party identification and unemployment. I went into this thesis hoping that I could measure change in party identification via the proxy measure of whom the respondent voted for in 2008. However, there were no respondents in the sample who voted for John McCain (the 2008 Republican presidential candidate), who identified as Democrat in 2012, and who identified as either "Unemployed" or "Temporarily laid off." In fact, there were only 6 respondents who voted for McCain in 2008 and identified as unemployed in 2012. Thus instead, I will look for an association between unemployment and party identification.

In order to support my unemployment hypotheses I am looking for two things: unemployed respondents to be less likely to identify as Republican and unemployed respondents to be more likely to identify as Democrat. While we cannot know if respondents changed party once they became unemployed, these findings would provide support to Margalit's (2013) findings that unemployed people tend to support increased welfare spending (associated with the Democratic Party) more than they do when they are employed. Furthermore, I would also hope to find that there are variations in how blacks', whites', and Latinos' party identification is affected by unemployment. Ideally, any observed difference in how their party identification is affected by unemployment would be explained by differences in belief in linked fate between the groups.

However, and contrary to my expectations, I found that there was no statistically significant difference in the amount that blacks, whites, and Latinos believed in linked fate in the 2012 ANES data. Furthermore, I found that unemployment is not a significant determinant of whether respondents identify as Democrat. Unemployed individuals are less likely to identify as Republicans, but this effect washes away once race/ethnicity are included as controls. Unemployed respondents are more likely to identify as Independent, and this finding was statistically significant across all regression models. Contrary to my predictions, unemployment exerts the same effect on party identification across blacks, whites, and Latinos. Furthermore, linked fate wasn't a significant indicator of party identification when race/ethnicity was controlled for.

In this thesis I will begin by providing a literature review that offers a foundation for my specific theories. Next I will explain my research design in more explicit detail and discuss all variables included in the regressions. Then I will discuss the empirical results,

first with a focus on unemployment and then with a focus on linked fate. Finally, I will conclude with a summary of the results and discuss their real-world implications. I will also suggest areas for further academic research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY

2.1 ECONOMIC VOTING THEORIES

There has been a great deal of research on how economics affects voting behavior (Margalit 2013; Feldman 1984; Carlsen 2000; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Kwon 2009; McIver 1982; Scott and Ropers 1980). According to Stanley Feldman (1984), there are two types of economic voters: those whose vote depends on the state of the national economy and those that vote based on their personal financials at any point in time. I have chosen to focus my research on the latter, because it will allow me to study self-interested voting. Self-interested voting is exactly what it implies: voters voting based on their personal interests and needs (Feldman 1984).

Pocketbook voting, a form of self-interest voting, is the idea that people vote based on what they directly experience in relation to the economy: their pocketbooks (Feldman 1984). Feldman (1984) says that one reason voters may vote based on their personal experiences is that it is easier to know that gas prices are changing, household items are becoming more expensive, etc. than to research and understand the state of the national economy. There are various pocketbook voting theories, but for the purpose of my study I hope to replicate Yotam Margalit's (2013) findings. With four years of panel data, starting from before the Great Recession until after, Margalit (2013) found that Republicans who became unemployed were likely to have increased levels of support for welfare spending

(associated with the Democratic Party) until their employment status improved. His findings support my belief that pocketbook voting should motivate voters who are unemployed to identify with the Democratic Party because the Democratic Party is associated with social programs and providing overall assistance to the unemployed⁶. A positive association between unemployment and Democratic party identification and a negative association between unemployment and Republican party identification would indicate that respondents are voting in their self-interest (Kwon 2009).

Scholars have hypothesized several conditions under which the Democratic Party would benefit from unemployment, but the fundamental idea follows Frederick Carlsen's (2000) clientele hypothesis which argues that left parties gain from high unemployment both when they are in government and when they are not. Democrats own the issue of unemployment under this theory (Carlsen 2000; Kwon 2009; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). Alternatively, other scholars theorize that if there is high unemployment under a Democratic President, voters might punish the Democratic Party more harshly and vote for a Republican candidate (Carlsen 2000). Since Democrats are thought to be the party best equipped to handle unemployment, if they fail then they will be punished more than a Republican government (Carlsen 2000). Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet's (1979) findings based on the 1976 United States congressional elections support this theory. However, there is still not consensus that there is any relationship between unemployment and party identification. In fact some research has suggested that there is no relationship between party identification and unemployment (Scott and Ropers 1980).

⁶ "Jobs and the Economy." *Democrats.org*. Democratic National Committee, n.d. Web. 8 Oct. 2015.

There is another theory that would leave both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party unrewarded by unemployment: protest voting. According to Van der Brug et. al. (2000), protest voters “have specific, cynical, attitudes towards politics” (77). Fed up with the normative parties and candidates, they vote for an unconventional, nontraditional party or candidate (Van der Brug et. Al. 2000). Some provide this as the explanation behind Bernie Sanders’ and Donald Trump’s political appeal in the 2016 presidential primaries⁷. While not necessarily an economic voting theory, protest voting will be something I can analyze as an alternative hypothesis by using Independents, as a variation of party identification, alongside Republicans and Democrats in my statistical analysis.

Contradictory to my hypothesis, Feldman believes the role of pocketbook voting is dependent on whether voters blame the government for their unemployment (Feldman 1984). Feldman (1984) finds that especially in the United States, largely because of the role of economic individualism, people don’t make the connection between their economic well-being and the government so they are not apt to punish the government for their personal hardship (240). During recessions, however, when constituents see other mass groups of unemployed people they then make the connection between their personal experience of unemployment and the role of the government in their employment circumstances. Margalit’s (2013) study supports Feldman’s recession hypothesis. However, I hope to further test this hypothesis by analyzing the 2012, post-Great Recession, ANES survey to determine whether when out of a recession this same relationship occurs.

⁷ Page, Julie. "Sanders Attracting Voters Who Seek More Than Protest Vote." *Salon.com*. Salon Media Group, 23 Jan. 2016. Web. 2 Feb. 2016.

When evaluating the pocketbook voting hypothesis, I have chosen to focus on party identification rather than 2012 vote choice in the presidential election, because vote choice could be the product of many things (likes and dislikes of candidates, etc.) whereas party identification is associating with a party based on the party's overall political platform (Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003). For instance, in the United States the Democratic and Republican Parties are respectively known for being most adept at two different economic occurrences: the Democratic Party is associated with resolving unemployment and the Republican Party is associated with resolving high inflation (Carlsen 2000).

My overall unemployment hypotheses are as follows:

2.1.1 Unemployment Hypotheses

1.1 There will be a positive association between unemployment status and Democratic party identification.

1.2 There will be a negative association between unemployment status and Republican party identification.

2.2 LINKED FATE AND THE ROLE OF RACE

Michael Dawson (1994) argued that black political unity—regardless of class, education, gender, etc.—observed in the 1988 presidential primary could be explained by “the historical legacy of racial and economic oppression that forged racial identity of African Americans” (4). Race has historically been the main determinant of blacks' life chances (ability to receive a high quality education, job opportunities, etc.) and as long as race remains the main determinant of their lives, blacks will continue to align themselves politically (Dawson 1994). This is the idea of linked fate. In this perspective, what is in the

best interest of the group is in the best interest of the individual. This means that blacks take their political cues from the group, and thus operate as a united political front (Dawson 1994). For the purpose of my study I plan to see if this racial linked fate connection continues to be a strong determinant for blacks. In addition, I will also study the effects of white and Latino linked fate. In line with Dawson's (1994) argument, I expect to find the highest levels of linked fate for blacks.

Latinos are the largest pan-ethnic group in the United States (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). However, being labeled as "Latino" and/or "Hispanic" has only emerged in recent years—post 1980 U.S. Census (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Latinos tend to identify with their country of origin, and it is a relatively new phenomenon that they are beginning to identify as "Latino" (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). The three main countries of origin for Latinos in the United States are Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Mexico and each has its own typical partisan identification: Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are most likely to identify as Democrat; Cubans are more likely to identify as Republican (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003). However, the Latino community as a whole has historically identified as Democrat (Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003). R. Michael Alvarez and Lisa Garcia Bedolla (2003) found in their analysis of the 2000 Latino Voter Study that Latino party identification is stable despite the different ways that Latinos may acquire their partisanship (in comparison to blacks and whites). Party identification is frequently acquired pre-political age (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). However, for early generation immigrants (like many Latinos) this process may be different if their parents are not involved or active in United States politics (Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). If a Latino voter is a first generation immigrant they also don't have the

ability to learn about the United States political parties through school (Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Despite these obstacles to their partisanship acquisition, Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla (2003) found that while initially newer and younger Latino voters tend to lean Independent, over time their national origin group shapes their party identification. This is why I believe that more than whites, but less than blacks, Latinos will believe in linked fate. While their group allegiances may be foremost to their national origin group, they are still more united under the umbrella of “Latino” than I believe whites are connected to one another.

While Dawson (1994) argues that blacks are united because of their historical (and consistent) oppression by the United States government, the ethnic groups that constitute “Latinos” do not have identical historical relationships with the government (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003)⁸. Latinos do have some shared experiences, though. The 2006 Immigrant Rights Marches protesting HR-4437 demonstrate this⁹ (Johnson and Hing 2007). Though HR-4437 specifically targeted undocumented immigrants, it became a rallying cry of the United States Latino community regardless of Latinos’ personal immigration status. Though immigration and policies frequently identified as “Latino issues” aren’t necessarily of equal importance to Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, when bills like HR-4437 appear to be targeting and affecting all Latinos despite their immigration status it works to unify the Latino community more than

⁸ The relationships between Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans with the United States government have all varied greatly (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Cubans were welcomed with open arms by the U.S. government due to their status as political refugees. The annexation of Puerto Rico made its residents’ experiences with the government unique, providing them with the legal ability to live in the United States. However, Mexicans have consistently been kept at bay by the government. They have been used as labor, without receiving rights that other groups have (example: Bracero Program).

⁹ “Latino Communities Rally Over Immigration Reform.” *PBS Newshour*. PBS. KPBS. 10 April 2006. Television.

it may have been originally. The 2000 presidential election also saw a high level of targeted campaigning for Latinos from both Republicans and Democrats (Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003). Spanish political advertisements and use of Spanish language radio and television to campaign towards Latinos removes the lines subdividing this pan-ethnic group. While not a homogenous group, they are campaigned to as one which helps define and unite them as “Latinos” rather than Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, etc.

While whites also have a party they are likely to identify with (Republican), I believe their vote is more based on self-interest rather than any sense of linked fate. Whites are the largest racial group in the United States, and highly diverse. Whites are unlikely to have identical integration experiences in the United States, identical ethnic backgrounds, etc. An example of this is that Latinos can racially self-identify as white. Those from the Middle East are also considered to be white. This exemplifies the diversity of the groups and people that fall under the “white” racial category. I believe that since whites are the most heterogeneous of the three groups in question a white (non-Latino) respondent for the 2012 ANES survey will be less likely than a black or Latino respondent to believe in a linked fate with their respective racial/ethnic group. Since blacks are the most historically united group, with longer and theoretically stronger ties to the Democratic Party than Latinos to either party, I believe that black respondents will be the most likely to believe in linked fate. I anticipate that Latinos’ belief in linked fate will fall in between that of whites and blacks. I predict Latinos will fall in between because while they still strongly identify with their countries of origin, they are beginning to identify more as a pan-ethnic group.

2.2.1 Linked Fate Hypotheses

2.1 White respondents will be less likely than blacks and Latinos to believe in linked fate.

2.2 Black respondents will be more likely than Latino and white respondents to believe in linked fate.

2.3 Latino respondents will be more likely than white respondents, but less likely than black respondents to believe in linked fate.

Due to my hypotheses regarding the varying degrees of racial/ethnic group consciousness, I theorize this will result in pocketbook voting not being equally applicable to Latinos, whites, and blacks. If respondents believe in linked fate, then they should be less likely to vote in their self-interest and thus less affected by their personal experiences (becoming unemployed). I believe that the extent to which respondents of the ANES survey vote in their self-interest (determined by the association between unemployment and party identification) should be affected by their belief in linked fate, which I believe will vary across ethnic and racial groups. Below I explicitly outline this hypothesis:

2.2.2 Pocketbook Voting Hypothesis

3.1 Pocketbook voting affects whites, blacks, and Latinos differently.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AND T-TEST RESULTS

3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

As discussed in Chapter One, I will use the 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES) data to test my hypotheses. Since it specifically asks respondents about linked fate, unemployment, and party identification, it is ideally suited for my research; however, this does not mean that the ANES data set is perfect. While there are many questions included in the survey, respondents are not required to answer every one of them and since the questions I am interested in are of a personal and sensitive nature, respondents may be more likely to skip them. Additionally, in 2012 only face-to-face respondents were asked about their belief in linked fate which significantly decreases the number of respondents in my analysis¹⁰. Furthermore, since they are self-reported answers this means that (specifically with the unemployment status question) the way that people answer may not necessarily be an accurate portrayal of their reality—the questions are subject to social desirability bias (Fisher 1993). The ANES survey asks individuals to characterize their employment status into one of eight categories: “Working now,” “Temporarily laid off,” “Unemployed,” “Retired,” “Permanently disabled,” “Homemaker,” and “Student” (105)¹¹. Since respondents can characterize themselves however they’d like to, my results may not provide the full picture: someone who is unemployed could, for the purposes of the study, label themselves a homemaker because it has a more positive connotation. Priming could

¹⁰ “ANES 2012 Time Series Study.” Stanford University and the University of Michigan. *The American National Election Studies (ANES)*. Web. 9 Sept. 2015.

¹¹ “ANES 2012 PRE-ELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE.” Stanford University and the University of Michigan. *The American National Election Studies (ANES)*. Web. 9 Sept. 2015.

also be occurring in the ANES survey (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). In the “ANES 2012 Post-Election Survey” respondents are first asked about their party registration (11) and later about their belief in linked fate (80). This could possibly be politicizing the linked fate answers. However, these aren’t things I can resolve so I can only take note of these potential issues.

My analysis calculates unemployment rates for each group the same way that the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics does: I will combine “Temporarily laid off” and “Unemployed” and divide by labor force (“Temporarily laid off,” “Unemployed,” and “Working now.”)¹² The ANES limits the number of ethnic/racial groups that I can study because it only asks the linked fate question in 2012 for whites, blacks, and Latinos¹³. While this doesn’t represent every ethnic/racial group in the United States it is still sufficient for my study since they are the three largest racial/ethnic groups in the United States—Latinos are the largest ethnic minority, whites are the racial majority, and blacks are the largest racial minority¹⁴.

As discussed in Chapter One, since I am unable to study party change I will instead be looking for associations between variables. To support my unemployment hypotheses I will be looking for a positive association between unemployment status and respondents identifying as Democrat, controlling for all other factors that might influence partisanship; I will also look for a negative association between unemployment status and respondents identifying as Republican. In order to reject the null of the pocketbook voting hypothesis,

¹² “How the Government Measures Unemployment.” *BLS.gov*. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 8 Oct. 2015. Web. 11 Nov. 2015.

¹³ Women were also asked whether they believed that their fates were tied to other women i.e. whether they believed in the linked fates of women.

¹⁴ *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012*. *Census.gov*. United States Census Bureau, n.d. Web. 3 Jan. 2016.

there will need to be differences in how blacks', whites', and Latinos' unemployment status affects their party identification. Finally, in order to reject the null of my linked fate hypothesis there will need to be statistically significant differences in how blacks, whites, and Latinos believe in linked fate.

As noted in Chapter One, I will predominantly be using OLS regressions to test my hypotheses, but I will also run logit regressions to confirm that the significance holds under both formats. The coefficient signs and statistical significance of the variables will be the results that I interpret. Also, in the interest of more simply and accurately interpreting my results, I have transformed all of my variables into dummy variables (1 indicating that someone is unemployed, female, etc. and 0 indicating that they identify as anything other than unemployed or are male, etc.).

3.1.1 Control Variables

I will be using *age, education, gender, marital status, feelings towards Obama,* and *income* as my main control variables when I run OLS and logit regressions. Race will be used not so much as a control variable, but as an alternative hypothesis to my linked fate hypotheses. When interpreting the results of unemployment status, race and linked fate will be used as controls.

Age

I have chosen to control for the age of respondents, because age has been found to be a powerful determinant of party affiliation (Newport 2014). For instance, young adults are more likely than older adults to identify as Democrat in the United States (Newport

2014). For this analysis I have disaggregated age into three dummy variable groups: *18-44 years*, *45-64 years*, and *65+ years*; the categories are consistent with the way the US Census¹⁵ groups individuals by age. The *45-64 years* age category is what will be the baseline group when I run my regressions.

Education

The variable *Educated* is coded as 1 if respondents have received an education beyond a high school diploma, whether that be an “Associate’s Degree”, “Bachelor’s Degree”, “Master’s Degree”, “Some College,” or a “Professional or Doctorate Degree”¹⁶. *Educated* is coded as 0 if a respondent has received a high school diploma or less education. Education is a commonly used control since there are established trends of voting for individuals of different levels of education. More educated voters have a greater likelihood of aligning themselves with the Democratic Party, relative to less educated voters¹⁷. Due to this, education is controlled for in order to ensure that results are mainly (at least) related to unemployment status rather than other variables. Stanley Feldman (1984) also found in his study of self-interested voting that education can be a possible confounding variable since with more education voters are better able to evaluate the national economy and thus their personal experiences with unemployment may be less likely to influence their political behavior. In addition, since there are very distinct discrepancies in access to

¹⁵ Howden, Lindsay M. and Julie A. Meyer. “Age and Composition: 2010.” *Census.gov*. United States Census Bureau, May 2011. Web. 20 Feb. 2016.

¹⁶ “ANES 2012 PRE-ELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE.” Stanford University and the University of Michigan. *The American National Election Studies (ANES)*. Web. 9 Sept. 2015.

¹⁷ Davis, Janel. “Is Education Level Tied to Voting Tendencies?” *Politifact.com*. PolitiFact, 5 Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Feb. 2016.

education and educational attainment across ethnic and racial lines in the United States, this makes it an even more important control for this demographic trait in my analysis (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010).

Gender

Women—regardless of their race, ethnicity, age, marital status, etc.—are more likely to identify as Democrat than their male peers who share the same characteristics (Ray 2008). For gender, I have created a dummy variable which is coded as 1 if the respondent is a female and 0 if they are male. Of the ANES sample, 48.1% are male and 51.9% are female.

Marital Status

Marital Status is controlled for because married voters “tend to lean more toward the conservative and Republican side” (Ray 2008:2). *Married* is coded as 1 if respondents are married, and coded as 0 if the respondent identified as “Never Married,” “Divorced,” “Widowed,” or “Separated”¹⁸.

Feelings towards Obama

I am including feelings towards Obama as one of my covariates because it allows me to control for people who may, for racial reasons, greatly like Obama (and thus be more inclined to identify with his party regardless of their belief in linked fate or unemployment status) or are less inclined to vote or identify with the Democratic Party based on a dislike

¹⁸ “ANES 2012 PRE-ELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE.” Stanford University and the University of Michigan. *The American National Election Studies (ANES)*. Web. 9 Sept. 2015.

for him. This variable attempts to eliminate the voters who either voted for him because he was black or didn't vote for him because he was black. I have created the variable "*Like Obama*" in an attempt to control for the racial factor of Obama as a candidate. This variable is based on respondents' answers to the ANES survey question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President?"¹⁹ Respondents who said they approved were coded as 1, 0 otherwise.

Income

Income is another important control variable; Michael Dawson (1994) theorized that class (as determined by income) was an alternative to black linked fate. He believed that when race no longer becomes the largest determinant of blacks' life chances class will become the largest determinant of their party identification (Dawson 1994). By controlling for income, this alternative theory can be tested. Though the ANES specifically asks respondents about their class identification, I have chosen to use income instead so that I can uniformly assign respondents to income categories (proxy for class categories) rather than by going off of how they self-identify. People in the United States tend to believe they are middle class when they may not be²⁰.

Income is divided into three categories: *Low Income*, *Mid Income*, and *High Income*. These groups are based on respondent's family income. I have defined these groups based on how Joao Alhanati (2012) of Investopedia classified these three groups. According to

¹⁹ "ANES 2012 PRE-ELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE." Stanford University and the University of Michigan. *The American National Election Studies (ANES)*. Web. 9 Sept. 2015. Page 2

²⁰ Shenker-Osorio, Anat. "Why Americans All Believe They Are 'Middle Class.'" *TheAtlantic.com*. Atlantic Media Company, 1 Aug. 2013. Web. 15 Jan. 2016.

Alhanati (2012), in 2012 low-income households were those that made less than \$32,500, middle-income households made between \$32,500 and \$150,000, and high-income households made more than \$150,000. *High Income* will be the baseline category in the regression models.

3.1.2 Race as an Alternative Hypothesis and Control Variable

Race is being used both as an alternative hypothesis and as a control variable. Race is known to largely predict party identification so its inclusion helps to see if each hypothesis is still relevant once added (Vanderleeuw 1990; Dawson 1994). Support for the null of my hypothesis will be found when including race as a control variable in my multivariate regressions. Linked fate is when individuals consciously vote and behave in conjunction with their ethnic and racial peers (Dawson 1994). However, without controlling for race white, black, and Latino linked fate may be expressing characteristics that are implicit within their respective racial groups. Rather than feeling a connection to their ethnic/racial group and voting in the best interest of the group (rather than their self-interest), ethnic/racial peers could be more likely to have the same party identification because of their shared experiences and circumstances. Latinos, blacks, and whites may still be voting in their self-interest, they may all just have similar self-interests to their racial/ethnic peers because of these shared experiences and circumstances. By including race as well as linked fate in the multivariate regressions I will be testing the validity of this counterfactual.

3.1.3 Independent Variables to Test Hypotheses

Unemployment Status

My unemployment variable is coded 1 if respondents identified as “Temporarily laid off” or “Unemployed.” *Unemployed* is coded as 0 if the respondent either didn’t answer the question or they responded as “Working now,” “Retired,” “Permanently disabled,” “Homemaker,” or “Student.” As previously noted, these are self-determined answers by the respondents so this measure of unemployment may not exactly reflect the unemployment status of the ANES respondents.

Initially, I hypothesized there would be different degrees of how much unemployment status affected party identification between blacks, whites, and Latinos. I believed that the reason for this hypothesized difference would be conditional on their belief in linked fate. However, after finding that there was no statistically significant difference between the extent to which these groups believed in linked fate I concluded that it could not be the causal mechanism for any variance in effect of unemployment on party identification for each racial group. As such, I decided to also study linked fate as an independent variable.

Linked Fate

Linked fate is being used as an independent variable in order to determine whether an individual's connection to their racial group affects their party identification. Each group was asked about their thoughts on linked fate (*Black Linked Fate, White Linked Fate, Latino Linked Fate*). Doing so makes it possible to compare the effects between the racial/ethnic groups. When linked fate is coded as 1, it means that respondents answered “yes” to the

ANES survey question: “Do you think that what happens to black people/Hispanic people/white people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?²¹” Those who answered no were coded as 0.

For this analysis, I will use belief in linked fate for whites as a comparison group since they make up the majority of the United States population and I am interested in looking at how linked fate affects Latinos and blacks in relation to whites. However, I will also be excluding Latinos for one regression in order to visually demonstrate the strength of white and black linked fate alongside one another.

3.1.4 Dependent Variable: Party Identification

The dependent variable for my research is party identification. Since the pocketbook voting literature is generally in reference to the Republican and Democratic Parties (or right and left parties), these were my initial measures of the dependent variable (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Carlsen 2000; Feldman 1984; Kwon 2009). While I truly only have one dependent variable (party identification²²), since I have converted all of my variables into dummy variables I have run regressions with Republican and Democrat as the dependent variable (when *Republican*=0 it represents those who identify as Democrat or Independent; when *Democrat*=0 it represents those who identify as Republican or Independent). However, as my research went on I found that respondents who identified as Independent

²¹ “ANES 2012 POST-ELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE.” Stanford University and the University of Michigan. *The American National Election Studies (ANES)*. Web. 9 Sept. 2015.

²² I am using answers from respondents surveyed before the 2012 election. The question is worded: “Does R think of self as Democrat, Republican, Independent, or what?” The respondents can respond: “No preference,” “Democrat,” “Republican,” “Independent,” “Other Party,” or not respond.

were of import to my project so I created an Independent dummy variable and ran the same regressions as I had for Democrat and Republican.

My main interest for the pocketbook voting hypotheses is to determine if unemployed respondents are more likely to switch to the Democratic Party. Regrettably, I wasn't able to analyze party change since there were too few respondents who identified (as measured by which candidate they voted for in 2008) as Republican in 2008, identified as Democrat in 2012, and were unemployed. In fact, in the sample, there were only 6 respondents that voted for McCain in 2008 and were unemployed in 2012. Thus I am only looking for an association between unemployment status and party identification.

3.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND T-TEST RESULTS

Table 1 shows the differences between blacks, whites, and Latinos in the 2012 ANES survey. The ANES respondents are not perfectly representative of the United States population. There is an overrepresentation of blacks in the sample, and a slight underrepresentation of whites and Latinos. Blacks make up 17.3% of the sample while they only constitute 13.2% of the United States population, Latinos make up 17.1% of the population when they actually made up 17.4% of the United States population in 2012, and whites are 59.4% of the sample but are actually 62.2% of the population. The remaining 6.3% is categorized as "Other non-Hispanic," but they will not be part of my study.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics				
		Blacks	Whites	Latinos
% of Sample		17.3%	59.4%	17.1%
% of US Group In 2012		13.2%	62.1%	17.4%
% of Group believe in Linked Fate		65.3%	62.1%	51.4%
Amount of Belief in Linked Fate	A lot	37.5%	24.6%	27.8%
	Some	53.0%	61.2%	58.0%
	Not very much	9.5%	14.2%	14.2%
% Democrat		76.2%	28.5%	51.1%
% Republican		2.7%	33.2%	16.1%
% Independent		20.0%	35.1%	30.9%
% "Other Party"		1.1%	3.2%	2.0%
% Voted Obama '08		97.4%	45.0%	74.9%
% Voted McCain '08		2.3%	51.9%	22.8%
% Voted "Other"		0.2%	3.1%	2.3%
% Unemployed		18.8%	10.9%	17.8%
% Employed		81.2%	89.1%	82.2%
Number of Observations		1,016	3,495	1,005

Note: All entries except for “Number of Observations” is normalized to population for comparability (percentage of that respective ethnic/racial group). Unemployment rates are calculated for each group in the same way that the Bureau of Labor Statistics does: “Temporarily laid off” and “Unemployed” combined, and then divided by labor force (“Temporarily laid off,” “Unemployed,” and “Working now.”) *Sources:* The data in this table is derived from the 2012 U.S. Census and 2012 ANES data.

Consistent with the literature, black respondents mostly identified as Democrat (76.2%), followed by Latinos (51.1%); whites were the least likely, as only 28.5% identified as Democrat. Minorities were also far more likely to be unemployed than were whites, which aligns with existing research²³. Amongst blacks, 18.8% were unemployed versus 10.9% of the whites and 17.8% for Latinos²⁴. Also consistent with the 2012 United States workforce, whites had the highest employment rate at 89.1%. Among blacks 81.2% of the sample were employed and 82.2% of Latinos were employed.

²³ In fact Derek Thompson reports in “The Workforce Is Even More Divided by Race Than You Think” (2013) that consistently for the last four decades blacks have had the highest rates of unemployment, followed by Latinos, and then whites.

²⁴ For the purposes of my study I will calculate unemployment rates for each group the same way that the Bureau of Labor Statistics does: I will combine “Temporarily laid off” and “Unemployed” and divide by labor force (“Temporarily laid off,” “Unemployed,” and “Working now.”)

As I hypothesized a larger percent of blacks than either of the other groups believed in linked fate (65.3% of blacks said they believed in linked fate). However, contrary to my hypotheses, whites had the second largest percentage with 62.1% of white respondents saying that they believed in linked fate²⁵. While these are the raw differences between the groups, Table 2 shows that based on t-tests these distributions are not statistically significant differences at even the 10% level. Table 2 shows the results of paired t-tests. Linked fate for blacks and linked fate for Latinos were paired with linked fate for whites; then linked fate for Latinos was paired with linked fate for blacks to determine whether the same amount of blacks and Latinos in this sample believe in linked fate. The results immediately discredit my hypothesis that any observed differences in how blacks', whites', and Latinos' party identification is affected by unemployment is caused by differences in their belief in linked fate. Not only were whites more likely than Latinos to believe in linked fate, but this wasn't even a statistically significant difference. Since there was no statistically significant difference in how the groups feel attached to their respective group, this variable couldn't be what causes any hypothesized discrepancies in the way racial/ethnic groups are affected by unemployment.

Table 2: Linked Fate T-test Results

	Mean Difference from White Linked Fate	Std. Error	P-Value
Black Linked Fate	-0.023	0.078	0.767
Latino Linked Fate¹	0.015	0.019	0.446
	Mean Difference from Black Linked Fate	Std. Error	P-Value
Latino Linked Fate²	-0.027	0.047	0.571

Note: When Linked Fate=1 this means that a respondent said that they believed in linked fate with their racial/ethnic peers. Linked Fate=0 meant that they do not believe in linked fate. Black Linked Fate and Latino Linked Fate¹ were paired with White Linked Fate for the t-tests. Latino Linked Fate² was paired with Black Linked Fate in order to

²⁵ These percentages are based on respondents who answered the linked fate question.

allow me to conclude that no pairings of linked fate had statistically significant differences. *Source:* The data in this table is derived from the 2012 ANES.

CHAPTER FOUR: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

4.1 UNEMPLOYMENT REGRESSION ANALYSIS

There are six regression tables in this empirical analysis. I created three different multivariate regression tables to display my results for each version of the dependent variable, party identification: *Democrat, Republican, and Independent*. These three regression tables include six models. Model 1 includes *Unemployed* (explanatory variable of interest) and my base controls: *Age, Education, Gender, Marital Status, Like Obama* and *Income*. Model 1 is the baseline model that all other models are built upon; the variables included in it are included in all other models. Model 2 builds on Model 1 by now including the *Linked Fate* variables of *Black Linked Fate* and *Latino Linked Fate*. Model 3 includes *Black Linked Fate* and *White Linked Fate*, using *Latino Linked Fate* as the comparison. Model 4 uses *Black Linked Fate* and *White Linked Fate* but also adds *Race and Ethnicity* as a control by including *Black* and *White*. Model 5 reverts back to using *Black Linked Fate* and *Latino Linked Fate* and now includes *Black* and *Latino* to test race as an alternative hypothesis. The Logit Model, Model 6, includes the same covariates as in Model 5, but using logit analysis as a robustness check. Robust standard errors are used in all models.

I also use the same model to estimate the effects of unemployment for each racial/ethnic group. All the variables of these regression tables are consistent throughout; it is the race or ethnicity of the respondents analyzed and the type of regression run that varies. The first two models are only the results of black respondents: Model 1 is an OLS

regression, Model 2 is a logit regression. The second two models are for Latino respondents: Model 3 is an OLS regression, Model 4 is a logit regression. The last two models are for whites, Model 5 is an OLS regression and Model 6 is a logit regression. Something important to note when analyzing these results is that the significance of variables is likely to be smaller because of the smaller sample sizes when looking at blacks, whites, and Latinos separately. Again, robust standard errors are used in all models.

4.1.1 Effect of Unemployment on Democrat Party Identification

The results from this analysis indicate no statistically significant effect, at the 95% confidence interval or above, of unemployment on the likelihood of a responding as a Democrat in comparison to identifying as Republican or Independent. Table 3 shows these results. Thus, these findings fail to support my hypothesis that there would be a positive association between Democrat party identification and unemployment. The coefficient is negative so even if it had been statistically significant the results would imply that being unemployed would make a respondent less likely to identify as Democrat than Republican or Independent.

Table 3: Effect of Unemployment on Party Identification: Democrat

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Logit
Unemployed	-0.014 (0.033)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.023 (0.032)	-0.044 (0.032)	-0.045 (0.032)	-0.254 (0.184)
<i>Linked Fate</i>						
Black Linked Fate		0.161*** (0.019)	0.141*** (0.019)	0.000 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.027 (0.144)
Latino Linked Fate		0.068** (0.022)			0.023 (0.029)	0.113 (0.156)
White Linked Fate			-0.041*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.012)		
<i>Race and Ethnicity</i>						
Black				0.141*** (0.023)	0.216*** (0.022)	1.117*** (0.128)
White				-0.082*** (0.015)		
Latino					0.092*** (0.022)	0.518*** (0.119)
<i>Controls</i>						
Age: 18-44 years	-0.037** (0.012)	-0.037** (0.012)	-0.036** (0.012)	-0.040*** (0.012)	-0.041*** (0.012)	-0.263*** (0.076)
Age: 65+ years	0.001 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.007 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.096 (0.091)
Educated	-0.031** (0.012)	-0.031** (0.011)	-0.029* (0.011)	-0.024* (0.011)	-0.022 (0.011)	-0.142* (0.071)
Female	0.059*** (0.011)	0.063*** (0.011)	0.060*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.367*** (0.067)
Married	-0.046*** (0.011)	-0.035** (0.011)	-0.035** (0.011)	-0.028* (0.011)	-0.030** (0.011)	-0.186** (0.069)
Like Obama	0.544*** (0.011)	0.513*** (0.012)	0.512*** (0.012)	0.484*** (0.012)	0.482*** (0.012)	2.554*** (0.080)
Low Income	-0.010	-0.011	-0.013	-0.019	-0.020	-0.121

	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.081)
Mid Income	0.006 (0.014)	0.007 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)	0.066 (0.086)
Constant	0.134*** (0.016)	0.120*** (0.016)	0.144*** (0.017)	0.180*** (0.020)	0.102*** (0.016)	-2.218*** (0.115)
Observations	5756	5756	5756	5756	5756	5756
R2	0.321	0.331	0.332	0.344	0.345	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The dependent variable in all models is a dichotomous variable where one indicates a respondent identified as Democrat, zero if the respondent identified as Independent or Republican. The logit analysis serves as a robustness check for the OLS estimates. In Models 2, 5, and 6 whites who believe in linked fate are the comparison for the Linked Fate results found. In Models 3 and 4 Latinos who believe in linked fate are the comparison group. *Source:* The data in this table is derived from the 2012 ANES.

A puzzling result from Table 3 is that it indicates that being *18-44 years (Young)* and *Educated* makes a respondent less likely to identify as Democrat than Republican or Independent. The negative effect of being *Young* is significant (to varying degrees between significance at the 99% confidence interval and the 99.9% confidence interval) across all six models. *Education* is also significant, though with less of a statistically significant effect (significance ranging between no significance in Model 5 or significance at the 99% confidence interval in Models 1 and 2) across all models except for Model 5. One reason for these peculiar results could be because of the coding of the dependent variable. Since it is comparing identifying as Democrat to Republican and Independent this could be confusing the results. It could also be due to the fact that most of the *Young* and *Educated* respondents are white and thus more likely to be Republican.

Consistent with the literature, being *Female* is positively associated with identifying as a Democrat rather than Republican or Independent (Ray 2008). This effect is statistically significant with a 99% confidence interval across all six models. Being *married* also has a consistently significant negative impact on whether respondents identify as Democrat.

Furthermore, consistent with my expectations, whether a respondent *likes Obama* has a significant positive impact on whether they identify as Democrat.

Though I can now conclude that I find no support for my unemployment hypothesis 1.1 (a positive association between unemployment and Democratic party identification) using this sample, I can still address the question of whether the effects of unemployment are homogenous across the population (whites, blacks, and Latinos). Table 4 shows that for whites, blacks, and Latinos unemployment isn't a statistically significant indicator of party identification at the 95% or higher confidence interval. Furthermore, in the 2012 ANES sample, unemployment has the same negative impact on whether black, white, and Latino respondents identify as Democrat rather than Republican or Independent. These two findings do not support the 3.1 hypothesis that pocketbook voting isn't equally true for the major ethnic/racial groups in the United States.

Table 4: Effect of Unemployment on Party Identification by Race: Democrat

	(1) Blacks	(2) Black Logit	(3) Whites	(4) White Logit	(5) Latinos	(6) Latino Logit
Unemployed	-0.016 (0.055)	-0.105 (0.311)	-0.081 (0.046)	-0.554 (0.345)	-0.045 (0.066)	-0.220 (0.326)
<i>Controls</i>						
Age: 18-44 years	-0.088** (0.029)	-0.508** (0.169)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.148 (0.106)	-0.069* (0.032)	-0.356* (0.165)
Age: 65+ years	0.022 (0.037)	0.158 (0.263)	0.023 (0.017)	0.159 (0.117)	0.014 (0.045)	0.070 (0.235)
Educated	-0.019 (0.026)	-0.127 (0.162)	-0.024 (0.014)	-0.183 (0.101)	-0.060* (0.030)	-0.304* (0.148)
Female	0.102*** (0.027)	0.598*** (0.159)	0.033* (0.013)	0.228* (0.091)	0.056 (0.029)	0.287 (0.147)
Married	0.029 (0.029)	0.170 (0.179)	-0.037** (0.014)	-0.251** (0.094)	-0.041 (0.030)	-0.212 (0.150)
Like Obama	0.405*** (0.063)	1.833*** (0.289)	0.493*** (0.015)	2.778*** (0.100)	0.469*** (0.030)	2.159*** (0.174)
Low Income	0.020 (0.029)	0.118 (0.180)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.171 (0.119)	-0.048 (0.033)	-0.238 (0.167)
Mid Income	-0.043 (0.039)	-0.248 (0.212)	0.026 (0.016)	0.194 (0.112)	0.009 (0.038)	0.055 (0.195)
Constant	0.361*** (0.069)	-0.596 (0.343)	0.103*** (0.019)	-2.323*** (0.154)	0.264*** (0.046)	-1.107*** (0.242)
Observations	994	994	3425	3425	956	956
R2	0.092		0.302		0.208	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The dependent variable in all models is a dichotomous variable where one indicates a respondent identified as Democrat, zero if the respondent identified as Independent or Republican. The same model is run for blacks, whites, and Latinos in order to confirm or refute the idea that the major racial/ethnic groups in the United States are affected the same by unemployment. The logit analysis for each race/ethnicity serves as a robustness check for the OLS estimates. Due to the smaller sample sizes when looking at the racial and ethnic groups separately, the significance of variables decreases. *Source:* The data in this table is derived from the 2012 ANES.

4.1.2 Effect of Unemployment on Republican Party Identification

In contrast with the results from the regressions using Democrat as the dependent variable, the results using Republican as the dependent variable are more in line with my hypotheses. When Republican is the dependent variable there is a statistically significant negative effect of unemployment status at the 95% confidence interval for the first three regression models. However, when race is controlled for, unemployment is no longer statistically significant. Though the negative association is in line with what I predicted would happen as an extrapolation of Margalit’s findings, since it isn’t consistently significant I believe it at most tentatively supports hypothesis 1.2 (unemployment will have a negative impact on identifying as Republican).

Table 5: Effect of Unemployment on Party Identification: Republican

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Logit
Unemployed	-0.055* (0.024)	-0.050* (0.024)	-0.051* (0.024)	-0.043 (0.024)	-0.045 (0.024)	-0.518 (0.275)
<i>Linked Fate</i>						
Black Linked Fate		-0.047*** (0.009)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.496 (0.307)
Latino Linked Fate		-0.026 (0.016)			0.004 (0.021)	0.003 (0.203)
White Linked Fate			0.038*** (0.011)	0.022 (0.012)		
<i>Race</i>						
Black				-0.006 (0.012)	-0.058*** (0.011)	-1.096*** (0.234)
White				0.055*** (0.013)		
Latino					-0.046**	-0.332*

					(0.017)	(0.140)
<i>Controls</i>						
Age: 18-44 years	0.007 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)	0.057 (0.084)
Age: 65+ years	0.009 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031 (0.094)
Educated	0.030** (0.010)	0.030** (0.010)	0.027** (0.010)	0.024* (0.010)	0.026** (0.010)	0.215** (0.079)
Female	0.009 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.054 (0.073)
Married	0.067*** (0.010)	0.064*** (0.010)	0.063*** (0.010)	0.061*** (0.010)	0.063*** (0.010)	0.452*** (0.076)
Like Obama	-0.427*** (0.011)	-0.417*** (0.011)	-0.414*** (0.011)	-0.403*** (0.011)	-0.408*** (0.011)	-2.658*** (0.095)
Low Income	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.050 (0.092)
Mid Income	0.000 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.090)
Constant	0.422*** (0.016)	0.427*** (0.016)	0.407*** (0.017)	0.373*** (0.019)	0.433*** (0.016)	-0.420*** (0.109)
Observations	5756	5756	5756	5756	5756	5756
R2	0.271	0.272	0.273	0.276	0.274	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The dependent variable in all models is a dichotomous variable where one indicates a respondent identified as Republican, zero if the respondent identified as Independent or Democrat. The logit analysis serves as a robustness check for the OLS estimates. In Models 2, 5, and 6 whites who believe in linked fate are the comparison for the Linked Fate results found. In Models 3 and 4 Latinos who believe in linked fate are the comparison group. *Source:* The data in this table is derived from the 2012 ANES.

Educated, Marital Status, and Like Obama remain statistically significant across all six models. As would be assumed based on the results from Democrat, if a respondent *likes Obama* has a negative impact at the 99.9% confidence interval of whether they identify as Republican across all six models. Being *Married* is also significant at the 99.9% confidence interval across all six models, with being *Married* positively associated with identifying as

Republican rather than Democrat or Independent. Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, being *Educated* (above a high school diploma) makes a respondent more likely to identify as Republican. Possibly, this could be due to the coding of the *Education* variable. It includes several different categories of education above a high school diploma, so possibly combining them all into one variable has confused the results.

Table 6 shows that while no longer significant at the 95% confidence interval, all three racial/ethnic groups still operate in the same way with unemployment status being negatively associated with party identification (Republican). While this supports hypothesis 1.2, it disputes hypothesis 3.1. However, it is only the coefficient sign that supports hypothesis 1.2. The combined racial results with the Democrat and Republican regression indicate that there aren't statistically significant differences between blacks, whites, and Latinos in terms of how unemployment affects party identification for the Democratic and Republican Parties. All three groups, though there are negative effects, are not significantly affected by unemployment thus disputing the pocketbook hypothesis. It should be reiterated that a reason the significance of unemployment on Republican partisanship may have dropped is due to the smaller sample sizes when analyzing blacks, whites, and Latinos separately.

Table 6: Effect of Unemployment on Party Identification by Race: Republican

	(1) Blacks	(2) Black Logit	(3) Whites	(4) White Logit	(5) Latinos	(6) Latino Logit
Unemployed	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.683 (1.080)	-0.090 (0.055)	-0.602 (0.376)	-0.016 (0.047)	-0.219 (0.501)
<i>Controls</i>						
Age: 18-44 years	0.008 (0.011)	0.331 (0.436)	0.027 (0.017)	0.152 (0.099)	-0.058* (0.024)	-0.554* (0.219)
Age: 65+	0.010 (0.015)	0.483 (0.628)	0.007 (0.018)	0.047 (0.103)	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.246 (0.305)
Educated	0.010 (0.010)	0.456 (0.439)	0.034* (0.015)	0.199* (0.091)	0.044* (0.022)	0.414* (0.207)
Female	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.096 (0.389)	0.006 (0.014)	0.036 (0.083)	0.035 (0.021)	0.358 (0.202)
Married	0.006 (0.012)	0.226 (0.411)	0.075*** (0.015)	0.444*** (0.087)	0.052* (0.021)	0.511* (0.206)
Like Obama	-0.137** (0.045)	-2.291*** (0.434)	-0.446*** (0.013)	-2.711*** (0.117)	-0.347*** (0.029)	-2.587*** (0.223)
Low Income	0.009 (0.011)	0.429 (0.451)	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.070 (0.108)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.166 (0.242)
Mid Income	0.008 (0.015)	0.380 (0.543)	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.069 (0.102)	-0.009 (0.028)	-0.113 (0.252)
Constant	0.140** (0.046)	-2.428*** (0.719)	0.445*** (0.023)	-0.358** (0.123)	0.375*** (0.038)	-0.712* (0.285)
Observations	994	994	3425	3425	956	956
R2	0.047		0.235		0.223	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The dependent variable in all models is a dichotomous variable where one indicates a respondent identified as Republican, zero if the respondent identified as Independent or Democrat. The same model is run for blacks, whites, and Latinos in order to confirm or refute the idea that the major racial/ethnic groups in the United States are affected the same by unemployment. The logit analysis for each race/ethnicity serves as a robustness check for the OLS estimates. Due to the smaller sample sizes when looking at the racial and ethnic groups separately, the significance of variables decreases. *Source:* The data in this table is derived from the 2012 ANES.

4.1.3 Effect of Unemployment on Independent Party Identification

Based on the results of the regression models I ran for Tables 3 and 5, I decided to analyze Independent as a third category of party identification. I wanted to determine what respondents were more likely to identify as, relative to Republican and Democrat, when they described themselves as unemployed. Table 7 indicates that in fact at the 95% confidence interval being unemployed in this sample made respondents more likely to identify as Independent rather than Republican or Democrat. This would provide support for Van der Brug et. al.'s (2000) theory of protest voting. Even when controlling for race, being unemployed positively affects whether a respondent identifies as Independent rather than Republican or Democrat at the 95% confidence interval and this significance holds under the logit analysis as well. In fact, the effect of unemployment on whether a respondent identified as Independent was significant across all models. Being *Married*, *Liking Obama*, and being *Female* all have a statistically significant negative effect, across all models, on whether a respondent identifies as Independent rather than Republican or Democrat. This is probably due to the fact that they are all strong predictors of other party identification (*Married*=Republican Party; *Liking Obama* and being *Female*=Democratic Party).²⁶

²⁶ The regressions using Independent as the dependent variable are also the only times that *Income* (used as a proxy to measure social class) was found to be statistically significant. This variable was included as a way to test Michael Dawson's (1994) alternative theory of class to his race hypothesis. Based on the inconsistency of its significance, I believe my findings do not support the class hypothesis as a more appropriate theory than race to predict voting behavior.

Table 7: Effect of Unemployment on Party Identification: Independent

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Logit
Unemployed	0.064 (0.035)	0.071* (0.034)	0.068* (0.034)	0.080* (0.034)	0.083* (0.034)	0.387* (0.151)
<i>Linked Fate</i>						
Black Linked Fate		-0.097*** (0.018)	-0.093*** (0.019)	0.012 (0.024)	0.011 (0.024)	0.067 (0.139)
Latino Linked Fate		-0.024 (0.023)			-0.012 (0.030)	-0.059 (0.141)
White Linked Fate			0.006 (0.013)	-0.018 (0.014)		
<i>Race and Ethnicity</i>						
Black				-0.127*** (0.023)	-0.148*** (0.022)	-0.777*** (0.125)
White				0.026 (0.016)		
Latino					-0.041 (0.022)	-0.188 (0.104)
<i>Controls</i>						
Age: 18-44 years	0.028* (0.014)	0.027 (0.014)	0.026 (0.014)	0.027 (0.014)	0.029* (0.014)	0.136* (0.065)
Age: 65+ years	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.016)	-0.062 (0.078)
Educated	0.001 (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.018 (0.061)
Female	-0.070*** (0.012)	-0.072*** (0.012)	-0.071*** (0.012)	-0.069*** (0.012)	-0.068*** (0.012)	-0.319*** (0.058)
Married	-0.029* (0.013)	-0.035** (0.013)	-0.035** (0.013)	-0.040** (0.013)	-0.040** (0.013)	-0.183** (0.061)
Like Obama	-0.097*** (0.013)	-0.080*** (0.013)	-0.080*** (0.013)	-0.064*** (0.014)	-0.060*** (0.014)	-0.273*** (0.064)
Low Income	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.027	0.029* (0.014)	0.137* (0.064)

	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.069)
Mid Income	0.001 (0.016)	0.000 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.075)
Constant	0.406*** (0.019)	0.414*** (0.019)	0.410*** (0.020)	0.407*** (0.023)	0.424*** (0.019)	-0.289** (0.088)
Observations	5756	5756	5756	5756	5756	5756
R2	0.019	0.023	0.023	0.028	0.029	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The dependent variable in all models is a dichotomous variable where one indicates a respondent identified as Independent, zero if the respondent identified as Democrat or Republican. The logit analysis serves as a robustness check for the OLS estimates. In Models 2, 5, and 6 whites who believe in linked fate are the comparison for the Linked Fate results found. In Models 3 and 4 Latinos who believe in linked fate are the comparison group. *Source:* The data in this table is derived from the 2012 ANES.

After understanding that unemployment positively affects whether respondents identify as Independent, Table 8 shows that it is actually whites that appear to be driving these results. After controlling for race by separating the three ethnic/racial groups, unemployment only remains statistically significant (at the 95% confidence interval) for whites. This disputes the role of linked fate on how unemployment affects party identification since Table 2 shows that there isn't a difference in how whites, blacks, and Latinos believe in linked fate, meaning that based on my hypothesis there shouldn't be any discrepancy between how linked fate affects pocketbook voting (effect of unemployment on party identification.) Although Table 8 shows that the directional effect of unemployment remains the same for blacks, whites, and Latinos the effect of unemployment is stronger for whites. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that even if there was a statistically significant difference in how different ethnic/racial groups believe in linked fate, if I were only to focus on the raw sample data, then according to my hypothesis, Latinos should have been the most likely to have switched party identification when unemployed since they have the lowest levels of linked fate. All this said, Table 8 provides tentative support for blacks, whites, and Latinos being affected by unemployment

differently (hypothesis 3.1). However, an alternative reason for the varying effect of unemployment as a predictor of Independent party identification across whites, blacks, and Latinos could be due to the sample size of white, black, and Latino respondents. It is easier to find statistically significant results with a larger sample size i.e. the reason for the observed higher significance of unemployed status for whites may be because their sample size was the largest of all the racial groups.

Table 8: Effect of Unemployment on Party Identification by Race: Independent

	(1) Blacks	(2) Black Logit	(3) Whites	(4) White Logit	(5) Latinos	(6) Latino Logit
Unemployed	0.044 (0.055)	0.276 (0.311)	0.156* (0.063)	0.642* (0.255)	0.041 (0.066)	0.190 (0.293)
<i>Controls</i>						
Age: 18-44 years	0.086** (0.028)	0.538** (0.176)	-0.010 (0.019)	-0.044 (0.085)	0.121*** (0.033)	0.590*** (0.166)
Age: 65+ years	-0.015 (0.034)	-0.127 (0.280)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.091 (0.092)	0.008 (0.045)	0.045 (0.241)
Educated	0.025 (0.025)	0.183 (0.170)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.059 (0.078)	0.008 (0.030)	0.042 (0.147)
Female	-0.103*** (0.026)	-0.665*** (0.168)	-0.039* (0.016)	-0.171* (0.072)	-0.080** (0.030)	-0.389** (0.144)
Married	-0.032 (0.028)	-0.213 (0.191)	-0.039* (0.017)	-0.171* (0.075)	-0.023 (0.031)	-0.110 (0.149)
Like Obama	-0.245*** (0.065)	-1.202*** (0.290)	-0.030 (0.017)	-0.133 (0.074)	-0.119*** (0.033)	-0.560*** (0.152)
Low Income	-0.025 (0.027)	-0.163 (0.187)	0.043* (0.021)	0.188* (0.089)	0.049 (0.033)	0.234 (0.160)
Mid Income	0.025 (0.038)	0.168 (0.227)	-0.004 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.091)	-0.018 (0.040)	-0.086 (0.201)

Constant	0.452*** (0.070)	-0.209 (0.339)	0.410*** (0.025)	-0.356** (0.109)	0.358*** (0.048)	-0.619** (0.227)
Observations	994	994	3425	3425	956	956
R2	0.061		0.009		0.041	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The dependent variable in all models is a dichotomous variable where one indicates a respondent identified as Independent, zero if the respondent identified as Democrat or Republican. The same model is run for blacks, whites, and Latinos in order to confirm or refute the idea that the major racial/ethnic groups in the United States are affected the same by unemployment. The logit analysis for each race/ethnicity serves as a robustness check for the OLS estimates. Due to the smaller sample sizes when looking at the racial and ethnic groups separately, the significance of variables decreases. *Source:* The data in this table is derived from the 2012 ANES.

4.2 LINKED FATE AND RACE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

While linked fate doesn't appear to be a causal mechanism for how unemployment affects party identification (since they don't move in tandem and aren't consistently significant) this doesn't mean that linked fate couldn't have independently been a way to predict party identification. In fact, I've found that linked fate can be a good way of predicting party identification. Tables 3, 5, and 7 demonstrate this relationship.

4.2.1 Linked Fate and Blacks

Until race is controlled for in Table 3, whether or not a black respondent believes in linked fate is a strong predictor at the 99.9% confidence interval of their party identification. Consistent with the literature, blacks are more likely to be Democrat, but this finding would also be what we'd expect to find in order to support Dawson's (1994) theory that blacks are more likely to be Democrat because of their ties to their race (linked fate). His theory is tentatively supported by my results since linked fate is a strong predictor of party identification for blacks in the 2012 ANES sample. If blacks believe in linked fate, this makes them more likely to identify as Democrat than whites that believe in linked fate.

Tables 5 and 7 show that linked fate is also a good predictor of black party identification at the 99.9% confidence interval for whether a respondent identifies as Independent and Republican (until race is controlled for). Table 5 shows that a black person who believes in linked fate is less likely than a white or Latino person who believes in linked fate to identify as Republican rather than Democrat or Independent. Table 7 shows that a black respondent that believes in linked fate is less likely to identify as Independent than whites or Latinos that believe in linked fate. These results can be found in both Tables under Models 2 and 3 respectively. These are both statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence interval until Model 4 when race is introduced as a control. These results are in line with common knowledge of black voting patterns.

4.2.2 Linked Fate and Whites

Table 3 demonstrates that white respondents who believe in linked fate are statistically less likely at the 99.9% confidence interval to identify as Democrat (rather than Republican or Independent) than Latinos. However, there is not a significant difference in how whites who believe in linked fate and Latinos who believe in linked fate identify as Independent (see Table 7). Whites who believe in linked fate are statistically significantly, at the 99.9% confidence interval, more likely than Latinos who believe in linked fate to identify as Republican. Compared with blacks that believe in linked fate (above results), we are less accurately able to predict white respondents' party identification based on their belief in linked fate relative to that of Latinos who believe in linked fate. Consistent with the literature, this data set demonstrates that whites are more likely to identify as Republican and this is reinforced by their belief in linked fate.

4.2.3 Linked Fate and Latinos

Belief in linked fate for Latinos exerts the least consistent effect on party identification. Latinos who believe in linked fate are less likely than whites that believe in linked fate to identify as Republican or Independent. However even before race is added as a control, Latinos who believe in linked fate is not a statistically significant predictor of whether or not a respondent identifies as Republican rather than Democrat or Independent or whether they identify as Independent over Republican or Democrat (see Table 5). However, it is a statistically significant predictor at the 99% confidence interval for increasing the likelihood that one identifies as Democrat rather than Republican or Independent.

4.2.4 Race and Democrat Party Identification

Based on my analysis, race is clearly a strong predictor of party identification. However, it isn't consistently a statistically significant predictor of partisanship. Table 3, with Democrat as the dependent variable, is the only scenario where the effect of race remains statistically significant. If a respondent is black or Latino, they are more likely to identify as Democrat than white respondents are at the 99.9% confidence interval. Black respondents are also significantly more likely, at the 99.9% confidence interval, to identify as Democrat than are Latinos. Being white is also statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence interval: being white (relative to Latino) makes a respondent less likely to identify as Democrat.

4.2.5 Race and Republican Party Identification

Black respondents are less likely to identify as Republican than Latino respondents, but this isn't statistically significant. However, black respondents are less likely than white respondents at the 99.9% confidence interval to identify as Republican. White respondents at the 99.9% confidence interval are more likely to identify as Republican than Latino respondents. Latinos are less likely to identify as Republican when compared with whites, but this is only significant at the 99% confidence interval for OLS and the 95% confidence interval for the logit analysis.

4.2.6 Race and Independent Party Identification

Black respondents are the only racial/ethnic group that has statistically significant results for Independent party identification. Being black makes respondents less likely, at the 99.9% confidence interval, than Latinos and whites to identify as Independent. This is true under both the OLS and logit specifications presented in Table 7. Though not statistically significant, the coefficient for Latino is negative meaning that Latino respondents are less likely than white respondents to identify as Independent. Again though not statistically significant, being white (just based on the sign of the coefficient) makes respondents more likely than Latino respondents to identify as Independent. However, as previously noted, unemployment appeared to have the strongest effect on whites, though in the same direction as blacks and Latinos, for Table 8.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

This paper has sought to understand the role of linked fate in how unemployment affects party identification. While many of my initial hypotheses were not supported by my analysis of the 2012 ANES, the results still contribute to two fields of research— racial/ethnic politics in the United States and economic voting theory—that have not frequently been analyzed alongside one another. It is important to note that since the ANES data set is not fully representative of the United States population, my findings should be hesitantly and cautiously (if at all) extrapolated from. The main findings of this study can be broken up into three different sub-categories: unemployment findings, linked fate findings, and race/ethnicity findings.

5.1 UNEMPLOYMENT FINDINGS

Going into this research I underestimated the importance of Independent party identification. Contrary to my expectations, rather than making respondents more likely to identify as Democrat, when respondents are unemployed they are more likely to identify as Independent. However, consistent with my expectations, unemployed respondents were found to be statistically less likely to identify as Republican than as Democrat or Independent. The statistical significance of unemployed respondents identifying as Independent was maintained throughout all models; the statistical significance of unemployed respondents being less likely to identify as Republican, however, diminished when race was added as a control variable.

My fundamental theory that unemployed individuals would be motivated to identify with the Democratic Party for material self-interest was not supported by my analysis. A

more likely interpretation of the results could be that unemployed voters are distressed with the normative political parties of the United States, and/or feel failed by them, so they are protesting by identifying as Independent rather than Republican or Democrat²⁷. If this were the case, my findings would dispute Feldman's (1984) theory that only during recessions voters blame the government for their unemployment status. However, this is simply an unsubstantiated theory of what may be driving the results found from my analysis.

Since I studied party identification rather than vote choice, I believe an analysis similar to mine but using vote choice as the dependent variable could be informative to the literature. Though it was not my research focus, I did look at Independent respondents' 2012 vote choice: 54.8% voted for Obama and 45.2% voted for Romney²⁸. These descriptive statistics provide some hope that Margalit's (2013) pocketbook voting hypothesis could be tested if one focused on vote choice rather than party identification, but this theory would need to be substantiated through statistical analysis.

I anticipated that there would be differences in how Latinos', whites', and blacks' party identification would be affected by unemployment. While primarily my findings demonstrated that each group's party identification (whether using Democrat, Republican, or Independent as the dependent variable) appeared to be affected similarly (based on the sign of the "*Unemployed*" variable coefficient) by unemployment, there does appear to be at least superficially a difference in how strongly the groups are affected by unemployment—

²⁷ This move towards identifying as Independent cannot be due to the popularity of the Tea Party movement. The ANES survey offers respondents an "Other party" category that Tea Party support would fall under.

²⁸ These statistics are based off of Independent respondents' vote choice when only including Obama and Romney as 2012 vote choice options. When including "Other" candidate, 51.6% of Independent respondents voted for Obama, 42.6% voted for Romney, and 5.8% voted for "Other."

at least for when Independent is used as the dependent variable. When regressions were run for whites, Latinos, and blacks separately, whites were the only group that were statistically significantly more likely to identify as Independent if they were unemployed. However, as noted in Chapter Four, this observed difference in significance may be due to the larger sample size of whites. Since it is easier to find statistically significant results with larger sample sizes, this may be confounding the results. Thus, the evidence of differences in how blacks, Latinos, and whites are affected by unemployment is inconclusive at best.

5.2 LINKED FATE FINDINGS

While there aren't statistically significant differences in the degree to which Latinos, blacks, and whites believe in linked fate, the effect that their belief in linked fate has on their party identification does vary. Only in my analysis of the effects of unemployment and linked fate on Democrat party identification (Table 3), were all three variations of linked fate (*Black Linked Fate*, *Latino Linked Fate*, and *White Linked Fate*) consistently statistically significant (until race/ethnicity was controlled for). The results presented in Table 3 also best demonstrate the finding that belief in linked fate affects the groups differently. Whites who believe in linked fate are, at the 99.9% confidence interval, less likely to identify as Democrat when compared with blacks and Latinos who believe in linked fate. Blacks at the 99.9% confidence interval are more likely than whites and Latinos to identify as Democrat if they believe in linked fate. Latinos at the 99% confidence interval are more likely to identify as Democrat than whites. Belief in linked fate for whites strongly suggests that they will identify as Republican, whereas the opposite is true for Latinos and blacks. Blacks who believe in linked fate are the most statistically significant across all three dependent

variable variation (Democrat, Independent, and Republican) regression tables. All three regression estimates indicate that at the 99.9% confidence interval blacks are most likely to identify as Democrat. The findings for Latinos, blacks, and whites that believe in linked fate are all consistent with what literature has indicated as how Latinos, blacks, and whites would identify (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003). Thus, and as will be discussed more thoroughly in the race/ethnicity findings section, the results for linked fate may not be due to respondents' belief in a connection to their racial/ethnic peers, it may be that the linked fate variables are instead acting as a proxy for the race/ethnicity of the respondents and this is why the significance goes away once race and ethnicity are controlled for.

Not only are the directional effects of belief in linked fate different across Latinos, blacks, and whites, the strength of these effects also vary. Based on the 2012 ANES data, belief in black linked fate is a stronger determinant of party identification than belief in white or Latino linked fate. Across Tables 3, 5, and 7 black linked fate remains statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence interval. At least relative to Latinos who believe in linked fate, belief in white linked fate is only a statistically significant predictor of party identification for Democrat and Republican party identification—both at the 99.9% confidence interval. Latino belief in linked fate, relative to whites that believe in linked fate, is only a statistically significant predictor for Democrat party identification (at the 99% confidence interval). Partially in sync with my predictions, for the groups with the highest (though not statistically significantly different from the other groups) percent of their respective racial group that believe in linked fate (blacks), linked fate is a stronger

predictor than it is for the other groups. For the group with the lowest amount of belief in linked fate (Latinos), linked fate is the least accurate predictor of their party identification.

One of the most important findings from this research is the high degree of belief in linked fate amongst whites. The theory of linked fate comes out of the idea that minority groups have shared experiences with discrimination and that their race or ethnicities have been the main determinant of their life chances thus binding them politically, but the belief in linked fate for whites throws a wrench in this reasoning. Whites are the largest racial group and as such, have mainly determined what the experiences of Latinos and blacks will be with the United States government. They have not in any feasible way been discriminated against. However, perhaps the attempts to diversify schools, communities, government, etc. have been perceived as a threat to whites and it is this that has created a sense of shared fate amongst whites. These 2012 ANES results may indicate that there has been an impetus that has begun this move towards a Radical Right similar to what the European Union has been experiencing²⁹. Since the ANES's data on white linked fate only began with the 2012 survey, this will be, and is already, an incredibly important area of study. I believe this is especially true in relation to the unpredicted and seemingly meteoric rise of Donald Trump as the possible 2016 Republican presidential candidate. I believe Trump has tapped into, and is successfully appealing to, this sense of white linked fate in the United States³⁰.

²⁹ In recent years, Radical Right wing parties have become increasingly more electorally popular throughout the European Union (Bustikova 2014). These parties have appealed to anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic sentiment (Bustikova 2014).

³⁰ I believe Trump has done this by appealing to economic, cultural, etc. fears of immigrants and minority groups held by many white Americans (Tesler 2015). According to a recent YouGov poll, Trump's strongest supporters are Republicans who consider immigration issues their top priority (Tesler 2015).

A possible interpretation from these findings, though certainly not something that I am in any way attempting to recommend to politicians, is that Trump's electoral strategy of appealing to whites may be the most electorally successful. If whites, blacks, and Latinos (the three largest ethnic/racial voting blocks in the United States) all believe in linked fate equally then by specifically targeting your campaign to the largest of these three groups—whites—and tapping in to this sense of white unity, politicians will have the best chances of winning an election. In fact, politicians' efforts to campaign to minority groups may be alienating the largest possible constituent base—whites. If this were true, then the most electorally viable campaign strategy would either be to target whites specifically or not to target any racial or ethnic group specifically so as not to alienate any of the other racial/ethnic groups. However, this is extrapolating based on unrepresentative data so would need to be (and can be with the 2016 presidential election) tested.

The 2016 presidential election will be an important area of study for linked fate to determine whether the racially polarizing presence of Trump drives minority constituents to feel more connected to their respective ethnic/racial group. Furthermore the presence of a Latino candidate, Ted Cruz, will make the 2016 Republican primaries highly interesting and important as a way to observe Latino behavior, electoral participation, and belief in Latino linked fate. However, I believe the biggest confounder of any possible interpretations of the role of linked fate is race and ethnicity.

5.3 RACE/ETHNICITY FINDINGS

My findings highlight the importance of race/ethnicity in the United States. In fact, they are the strongest and most significant predictors of party identification in this study.

Why this is, I can only theorize but I suspect that it could be due to the shared circumstances (financial stability, educational opportunities and attainment, life chances, communities they come from, parental party identification, etc.) that respondents share with their racial/ethnic peers. Race and ethnicity have been, and remain, very important areas of future research for political scientists, especially when looking at whether individuals of the same ethnic/racial group are consciously or unconsciously voting based on a belief that their lives are tied to that of their ethnic/racial peers. Consistent with Dawson's (1994) study, being black rather than Latino or white is the most successful predictor of party identification. For every dependent variation and model, except for when looking at blacks', in relation to Latinos', Republican party identification, being black is statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence interval. Being white, relative to Latino respondents, is statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence interval for Republican and Democrat party identification. I believe that this is due to how much more likely white respondents are to identify as Republican. Latino respondents' party identification, relative to white respondents, is a successful predictor for Democrat party identification at the 99.9% confidence interval and Republican party identification at the 99% confidence interval.

Race and ethnicity are strong predictors as demonstrated by the fact that for the 2012 ANES data, when they are included as variables, the significance of linked fate drops away. The role of race for black respondents is strong, supporting Dawson's (1994) theory. However, based on the results it doesn't appear to be due to linked fate as Dawson proposed. I believe that it may be due to the implicit characteristics of blacks', Latinos', and whites' lives that are determined by their race rather than an explicit feeling that what

happens to an individual affects the rest of their respective ethnic/racial group. An alternative theory to the importance of voting based on a sense of linked fate, is that because racial and ethnic peers are relatively likely to have similar life experiences this is what drives them to have similar party identification. However, this is only a proposed reason for the results found in this study and needs to be studied more thoroughly.

5.4 SUMMARY

More than anything, my findings demonstrate the importance for more research to be done on whether pocketbook voting can be equally applied across the United States population. Because of the polarizing nature of Donald Trump, I believe that the 2016 presidential election will be a key and important election to study in regard to race, linked fate, party identification, and vote choice. The 2012 ANES data already found a high level of belief in linked fate for whites, Latinos, and blacks. Perhaps it is the results from the 2016 presidential election that will provide further insights into any possible differences in belief in linked fate or differences in pocketbook voting. Nonetheless, there is an undeniable role that race and ethnicity play in party identification and there is tentative, though inconclusive, evidence that this in turn affects pocketbook voting.

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